ࡱ>  /Ebjbjoo $  <z z ;;;;;OOOO8$OC(^s"ppp'''''''*C-N'!;ppppt';;'x0;;'p'r&T;;H'۹+O&'(0C(&V--H'H'v;'pppz :    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus McCUTCHEON etal. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia  No. 12 536. Argued October 8, 2013 Decided April 2, 2014  The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/424/1"424 U.S. 127. It may not, however, regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. ___, ___. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. Base limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee while aggregate limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees.HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/2/441a.html"2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 20112012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to 12 additional candidates and to a number of noncandidate political committees. He also alleges that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future, all within the base limits. McCutcheon and appellant Republican National Committee filed a complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the aggregate limits were unconstitutional under theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendment. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Governments motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the Governments anticorruption interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits survivedHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentscrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits. Held:The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 893 F.Supp. 2d 133, reversed and remanded. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito, concluded that the aggregate limits are invalid under theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendment. Pp.740. (a)Appellants substantialHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentchallenge to the current system of aggregate limits merits plenary consideration. Pp.714. (1)In Buckley, this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits in FECA. Buckley distinguished the two types of limits based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protectedHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentinterests. It subjected expenditure limits to the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on coreHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentrights of political expression. 424 U.S., at 4445. But it concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech and thus applied a lesser but still rigorous standard of review, id., at 29, under which such limits may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms, id., at 25. Because the Court found that the primary purpose of FECApreventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearancewas a sufficiently important governmental interest, id., at 2627, it upheld the base limit under the closely drawn test, id., at 29. After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph of its 139-page opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under FECA, noting that the provision ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties. Id., at 38. It concluded that the aggregate limit served to prevent circumvention of the base limit and was no more than a corollary of that limit. Id., at 38. Pp.79. (2)There is no need in this case to revisit Buckleys distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of review. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the closely drawn test applies, the analysis turns on the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. Here, given the substantial mismatch between the Governments stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the closely drawn test. Buckleys ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent just three sentences analyzing that limit, which had not been separately addressed by the parties. Appellants here, by contrast, have directly challenged the aggregate limits in place under BCRA, a different statutory regime whose limits operate against a distinct legal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley. The 1976 FECA Amendments added another layer of base limitscapping contributions from individuals to political committeesand an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. Since Buckley, the Federal Election Commission has also enacted an intricate regulatory scheme that further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits through unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to a particular candidate. 424 U.S., at 38. In addition to accounting for such statutory and regulatory changes, appellants raise distinct legal arguments not considered in Buckley, including an overbreadth challenge to the aggregate limit. Pp.1014. (b)SignificantHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentinterests are implicated here. Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individuals right to participate in the electoral process through both political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is hardly a modest restraint on those rights. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. In its simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits. And it is no response to say that the individual can simply contribute less than the base limits permit: To require one person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to penalize that individual for robustly exercis[ing] hisHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentrights. Davis v. Federal Election Commn,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/554/724"554 U.S. 724. In assessing theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentinterests at stake, the proper focus is on an individuals right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole point of theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentis to protect individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as useful to the democratic process. Pp.1418. (c)The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Pp.1836. (1)This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741. Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholders official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner influence over or access to elected officials or political parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commn,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/558/310"558 U.S. 310. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence must be respected in order to safeguard basicHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentrights, and the Court must err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it. Federal Election Commn v. Wisconsin Right to Life,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/551/449"551 U.S. 449(opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Pp.1821. (2)The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount, even though Congresss selection of a base limit indicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in any meaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckleys fear that an individual might contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through ... unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckleys circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive massive amounts of money that could be traced back to a particular donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Governments scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or implausible. Pp.2130. (3)The aggregate limits also violate theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentbecause they are not closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Buckley, supra, at 25. The Government argues that the aggregate limits prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might then recontribute a donation, but experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions are retained and spent by their recipients. And the Government has provided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is thus disproportionate to the Governments interest in preventing circumvention. Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Governments interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding unnecessary abridgment ofHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentrights. Buckley, supra, at 25. Such alternatives might include targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees, or tighter earmarking rules. Transfers, after all, are the key to the Governments concern about circumvention, but they can be addressed without such a direct and broad interference withHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentrights. Pp.3035. (4)Disclosure of contributions also reduces the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements, which are justified by a governmental interest in provid[ing] the electorate with information about the sources of election-related spending, Citizens United, supra, at 367, may deter corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity, Buckley, supra at 67. Disclosure requirements may burden speech, but they often represent a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. Particularly with modern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against corruption than it did when Buckley was decided. Pp.3536. (d)The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candidates or committees. That rationale dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior cases. Buckley confined its analysis to the possibility that massive amounts of money could be funneled to a particular candidate in excess of the base limits. 424 U.S., at 38. Recasting as corruption a donors widely distributed support for a political party would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. And though the Government suggests that solicitation of large contributions poses the corruption danger, the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Pp.3639. Justice Thomas agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under theHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/424/1"424 U.S. 1, and subject BCRAs aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail. Buckleys analytic foundation ... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt//text/528/377"528 U.S. 377(Thomas, J., dissenting). Contributions and expenditures are simply two sides of the sameHYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct-cgi/get-const?amendmenti"First Amendmentcoin, and this Courts efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere word games rather than any cognizable constitutional law principle. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pp.15. Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. 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